Indifferentiability analysis of symmetric key ciphers
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Date
2025-08-26
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Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata
Abstract
The thesis presented here analyses the security of certain selected symmetric key ciphers -
The ciphers analyzed are the 2 and 3-round Confusion-Diffusion Network, the 3-round Cascade
Cipher with two independent keys, and the Feistel Construction with 7 and 8 rounds.
Substitution Permutation Networks (SPNs) are widely used in the design of modern symmetric
cryptographic building blocks. Attacks against the 2-round Confusion-Diffusion Network
construction have been exhibited by Dodis et al. (2016a) in their Eurocrypt 2016 paper titled
‘Indifferentiability of Confusion-Diffusion Networks’, and by Da, Xu and Guo (2021b) in their
paper ‘Sequential Indifferentiability of Confusion-Diffusion Networks’. Both attacks mentioned
above were incomplete/erroneous. As part of our first result, we provide a corrected attack
on the 2-round NLCDN. Our attack on the 2-round CDN is primitive-construction-sequential,
implying that the construction is not secure even in the weaker sequential indifferentiability
setting of Mandal, Patarin and Seurin (2012a).
The second part of our first results focuses on Cascade Ciphers. We present an attack on
the 3-round cascade construction employing any 2n-bit to 3n-bit non-idealized key scheduling
function, generalising the heuristic attack based on ’certain’ stronger key schedules as described
by Guo, Lin and Liu (2016) in ‘Revisiting Cascade Ciphers in Indifferentiability Setting’.
Next, as a follow up of the above work, we show that the 3-round Confusion-Diffusion Network
construction with linear diffusion layers is indifferentiable from an ideal permutation. This,
in conjunction with the previous negative result, shows the tightness of our indifferentiability
result.
The final work in this thesis explores the Feistel construction. There have been a series of
studies on whether an ideal cipher can be built from a random oracle using a Feistel network.
We present a general proof framework that lets us prove the indifferentiability of 7 or more
rounds of Feistel. In particular, this is the first indifferentiability proof for 7-round Feistel, and
in addition, the 8-round proof is considerably simpler than the previously-known proof.
Description
This thesis is under the supervision of Prof. Mridul Nandi
Keywords
Indifferentiability, Block cipher, permutation, random function
Citation
122p.
